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Abstract:  This paper demonstrates that the optimal willingness to pay for a stock is the p ayoff from 
holding the stock for one period when investors have different expectations, and that the willingness to 
pay can be represented as the sum of the expected present value of future dividends and the expected 
present value of the gap between the future equilibrium price and willingness to pay. This speculative 
behavior based on the awareness of heterogeneity in expectations is supported by the volatility test and 
the predictability of the dispersion in expectations across investors.    
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
Although difficult to model, heterogeneous expectations among investors in financial 
markets seem prevalent. Using survey data from the Yen-Dollar exchange rate market, 
Ito (1990) and Elliott and Ito (1999) show that a trading strategy based on individual 
participants’ expectations can create average positive profits over time although these 
expectations are irrational and heterogeneous. This evidence contradicts the supposition 
that only investors with rational (and homogeneous) expectations would survive over 
time. Furthermore, Chen, Hong, and Stein (2001) and Diether, Malloy, and Scherbina 
(2001) report that the dispersion in expectations across investors contains additional 
information to forecast future stock returns.  
  However, there has been little research on the relation between movements of 
stock prices and consideration of resale gains from heterogeneous expectations. 
Assuming infinite collective wealth within a class of investors and no short sales, 
Harrison and Kreps (1978) show that the willingness to pay for a stock targets short-term 
resale gains, and deviates from the present value of future dividends when expectations 
are heterogeneous. This deviation is called speculative premium. Morris (1996) further 
shows that the speculative premium exists until learning is complete, that is, until there is 
no difference in posterior beliefs at the infinite horizon. 
  Using less restrictive assumptions, this paper demonstrates that the optimal 
willingness to pay for a stock is the payoff from holding the stock for one period when 
investors are aware of heterogeneous expectations, which can be represented as the sum 
of the expected present value of future dividends and the expected present value of the 
gap between the future equilibrium price and willingness to pay.   2
   These results provide two empirical implications. First, volatility tests of more 
than one holding period would not be supported either because optimal willingness to pay 
for a stock is the payoff from holding a stock for one period, or because the expected 
present value of the gap between the future equilibrium price and willingness to pay is 
not considered. Second, the dispersion in expectations across investors will affect the 
current stock price and future stock returns since the expected gap between the market’s 
value and an investor’s valuation is included in an investor’s willingness to pay.  
  These implications examined in the second part of this paper are generally 
supported by data. First, the volatility test with homogeneous expectations (Mankiw, 
Romer, and Shapiro (1991)) is more likely to reject the present value hypothesis as the 
holding period increases. This rejection appears to result from the growth of the gap 
between the future equilibrium price and willingness to pay. By using long-horizon 
regressions, I next show that the dispersion in expectations does have predictive power 
for future stock returns and contains information aside from that contained in other 
variables used to forecast future stock returns. These results are consistent with the results 
for individual stocks in Chen, Hong, and Stein (2001) and Diether, Malloy, and 
Scherbina (2001), although this paper attributes the prediction of returns to speculative 
behavior rather than over-confidence.  
  The structure of this paper is as follows. Section 2 presents a model to show how 
investors determine their willingness to pay for a stock under heterogeneous expectations. 
Section 3 provides evidence for the implications by examining the volatility test and the 
predictability of the dispersion in expectations. Section 4 contains concluding remarks. 
The Appendix contains some proofs and provides additional statistical information.    3
2. OPTIMAL INVESTMENT DECISION 
Consider a financial market with stocks and bonds. If an investor holds a share of the 
stock between time t and t+1, she receives dividends, denoted by  1 + t D , immediately prior 
to time t+1 and can resell at time t+1. If she holds a risk-free bond, she receives a 
constant return r. Investors decide whether to buy stocks or bonds in their portfolio and 
how long to hold the assets to maximize wealth. For simplicity, investors are assumed to 
be risk-neutral and to have an identical discount rate (γ ) equal to 
r + 1
1
. Investors can go 
short by a finite amount (e.g. their wealth) when they become pessimistic about the 
stock.
1 Finally, investors have heterogeneous expectations due to different initial priors of 





t P  is defined as an  investor’s willingness to pay for a stock at time t 
where the optimal investment decision rule is:  
 Buy  stocks  if 
a
t t P P < , and buy bonds if 
a
t t P P >  
where the superscript a denotes an  investor, and  t P  is the price of a stock. 
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t E  is the conditional expectation operator for investor ‘a’ at time t. 
                                                           
1 The limited short sales assumption is necessary since investors are assumed to be risk-neutral. 
2 Due to this assumption, investors who learn from the stock market always consider what others are 
expecting to evaluate the worth of the stock, as shown in Morris (1996).   4
 
a
t S  is an investor’s set of all strategies for buying a stock at time t and holding it for k 
periods ( ,... 2 , 1 = k ). The k-th element in 
a
t S  represents the expected present worth of a 
stock when buying at time t and holding it for k periods. An investor decides which 
element in 
a
t S  should be used as 
a
t P  in order to determine whether to buy stocks or 
bonds and how long the selected asset should be held based on information at time t. An 
investor’s optimization problem is, therefore, a choice of elements in 
a
t S  to compare to 
t P , which represents the expected present value of the wealth when  t P  is invested in 
bonds regardless of the holding period for bonds. In other words, the investor decides 
which strategy in 
a
t S  should measure the willingness to pay for a stock (
a
t P ). 
  Under the assumption of homogeneous expectations, all elements in 
a
t S  are equal. 
As a result, the optimization problem is trivial, and the willingness to pay for a stock can 
be written as the present value of all future dividends. In equilibrium, the present value of 
all future dividends equals the price of the stock. Under the assumption of heterogeneous 
expectations, however, an element in 
a
t S  does not necessarily equal other elements since 
an investor’s valuation can differ from the market equilibrium price. Note that strategies 
in 
a
t S  do not require any actual commitment after time t since there is no holding period 
obligation for stocks or bonds. In other words, investors can change their investment 
strategy without cost as market situation changes. 
  In the following proposition, I show that only the first element in 
a
t S  will be used 
as the willingness to pay for a stock when an investor maximizes expected wealth.    5
 
Proposition 1. When an investor maximizes wealth at time t, then  




t P D E P γ γ .        ( 1 )  
 
The proof is provided in the Appendix. One might conjecture that the maximum in 
a
t S  
should be the willingness to pay for a stock because it shows the maximum expected 
present worth that an investor can obtain by purchasing a stock at time t. However, this 
conjecture neglects the opportunity cost of not buying bonds. Suppose that an investor is 
expecting that the price of a stock will rise sharply at time t+k. Although the stock should 
be attractive to this investor at time t, the investor should not buy the stock at time t if she 
expects the rate of return from the stock between time t and t+1 is lower than that from 
the bond. The investor should postpone the purchase of the stock until it can yield 
relatively higher one-period rate of return than the bond.  
  In the proof, I show that one can always find an alternative way to increase the 
expected discounted wealth if the holding period is longer than one period. Intuitively, 
the trading strategy using equation (1) as the willingness to pay for a stock is optimal 
because it does not sacrifice any option of buying bonds while other strategies must forgo 
some of such options. Since neither short sales constraints nor infinite collective wealth 
within a class of investors is required, Proposition 1 generalizes Harrison and Kreps 
(1978).  
Proposition 1 can also justify the short-horizon assumption assured under the De 
Long et al. (1990) model with two types of investors (noise traders and rational investors) 
and overlapping generations. Although De Long et al. (1990) justify the assumption by   6
frequent evaluation of financial managers, Proposition 1 shows that this is unnecessary 
since even long-lived investors care about short-term performance if they are aware of 
heterogeneous expectations.  
With Proposition 1, one may ask how stock prices should respond to an 
announcement that dividends at t+k (k>1) will increase. The answer is given in the 
following corollary, which can be obtained by the use of Proposition 1 consecutively. 
 
Corollary 1. Suppose that 0 ] [
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t P P E D E γ γ  for all t. (2) 
  
Corollary 1 shows that investors consider the dividend and resale option in the (distant) 
future if they are aware of heterogeneous expectations. In other words, Corollary 1 states 
that an investor’s willingness to pay incorporates future dividends and market valuations. 
Especially for example, investors whose future evaluation is pessimistic increase their 
current willingness to pay because of expected gains from a market price in the future. 
On the contrary, relatively optimistic investors reduce their current willingness to pay 
because of expected losses from a market price in the future.   
  Corollary 2 reflects Keynes’ “beauty contest”, where investors are interested in 
the opinions of others as well as their own estimates. Harrison and Kreps (1978) and 
Morris (1996) call the second term in equation (2) the speculative premium. The 
speculative premium is the expected resale gains due to the awareness of heterogeneity in 
expectations. Like bubbles, it has no relationship with fundamentals. However unlike 
bubbles, it can be non-explosive and can affect expected returns.    7
  Finally, I show that an equilibrium price exists in the stock market as long as 
limited short sales are allowed. In practice, short sales generally require greater cost than 
regular sales or purchases. As a result, the average outstanding value of short sale 
obligation of S&P 500 is about 0.2% of the total value from 1974 to 1983 (see Morris 
(1996)). Also, most institutional traders do not go short (see Chen, Hong and Stein 
(2001)). Under the assumption of limited short sales, the following proposition can be 
obtained. 
 
Proposition 2. If limited short sales are allowed up to some finite amount, then there 
exists an equilibrium in the stock market. 
 
The proof is provided in the Appendix. 
 
3. EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE 
In this section, I explore empirical implications of Proposition 1 and Corollary 1. In 
particular, I examine the consequence of heterogeneous expectations in the volatility test 
and whether the dispersion in expectations can predict future stock returns.  
If investors’ expectations are normally distributed,
3 then equation (2) can be 
written as 
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t P P E D E γ γ  
                                                           
3 If dividends follow a linear process and if investors’ initial priors about parameters for the dividend 
process are normally distributed, then Bayesian updating will lead investors’ posteriors to be normally 
distributed.    8















t Z Z E D E σ γ γ                (3) 
where  t Z  represents the relative position of the stock price in the standard normal 
distribution, 
a
t Z  represents the individual investor’s relative position in the standard 
normal distribution and  t σ  is the standard deviation of the willingness to pay across 
investors. Thus, the expectation of  t σ  affects individual investors’ willingness to pay.
 4 
Moreover, the prediction of equation (3) by an econometrician who has no knowledge 
about investors’ initial priors of the parameters about the dividend process is shown in the 
following corollary. 
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t Z E D E σ γ γ       ( 4 )  
                                                           
4 Even if one assumes a different distribution for the willingness to pay across investors, one can still show 
that the second term in equation (3) is positively related to the standard deviation of the non-normal 
distribution when the price of a stock is greater than the average willingness to pay across investors.   9
where  ] [⋅ t E  is the expectation operator for an econometrician who has no knowledge 
about investors’ initial priors of the parameters about the dividend process. 
 
If the stock price is above the average willingness to pay due to frictions in the market 
such as the cost of short sales, then  t Z  is positive
5 and Corollary 2 provides more explicit 
empirical predictions. For example, the volatility test is more likely to reject the present 
value hypothesis due to the existence of the nonnegative second term in equation (4). 
Furthermore, an investor’s willingness to pay is expected to rise on average as  t σ  
increases. As a result, if  t σ  follows a stationary process, then a high  t σ  predicts low 
future willingness to pay on average, and this will result in relatively low returns in the 
future. These predictions will be examined in the following sub-sections.  
 
3.1.Volatility Test: Revisited  
Since LeRoy and Porter (1981) and Shiller (1981), many studies reject the hypothesis that 
the price of a stock equals the rational expectation of the present value of future 
dividends. These and other studies implicitly or explicitly assume homogeneous 
expectations and conclude that the stock prices are (moderately) more volatile than 
fundamentals. (see LeRoy and Porter (1981), Shiller (1981), Campbell and Shiller 
(1988a, 1988b), and Mankiw, Romer and Shapiro (1991)). In this sub-section, I relax the 
assumption of homogeneous expectations and re-examine the test of the present value 
hypothesis.  
                                                           
5 Evidence on the upward bias in stock prices is reported in extensive literature. See Diether, Malloy, and 
Scherbina (2001), Chen, Hong and Stein (2001), and Lamont and Jones (2001) among them.   10
 
Definition 3. A marginal investor is defined as an investor whose willingness to pay for a 
stock equals the stock price. 
 
Investors whose willingness to pay for a stock is greater than the marginal investor’s will 
buy stocks as much as their wealth allows.
6 Since the marginal investor’s expectation of 
the payoff from holding a stock for one period equals the current stock price, one can 
apply the test of Mankiw, Romer and Shapiro (1991). Define  1 1
1 *
+ + + ≡ t t t P D P γ γ  and 
denote 
*
t E  as the marginal investor’s expectation operator at time t. Since 
0 ] [
1 * * = − t t t P P E ,  0 )] )( [(
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0
t P  is a naïve forecast of  t P . 










































E      (5) 
where  t W  is a normalizing variable which can be any variable known at time t. Mankiw, 











































q ,     (6) 
so that  0 ) (
1 * = t t q E . Since  0 ) (
1 = t q E  by the law of iterated projections, optimal decision 
making by the marginal investor should result in stock prices that make 
1
t q  zero on 
average. Using this 
1
t q  statistic, I test the present value hypothesis under heterogeneous 
expectations with a one-period horizon.   11
  Furthermore, under heterogeneous expectations the test statistic with a long-
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 is expected to deviate from zero as h increases 














 converges to the square 
of a normalized speculative premium. The reason is that since 
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and nonzero, then  0















































t q  is 
also expected to grow in magnitude as h increases. In summary, the present value 
                                                                                                                                                                             
6 Kaul, Mehrotra,and  Morck (2000) provides concrete evidence that demand curves for stocks slope down.   12
hypothesis is likely to be rejected as h increases, and the test statistic 
h
t q  is expected to be 
negative and grow in magnitude as h increases. The growth of 
h
t q  is also expected to 














 in the test statistic equation.  
  To test the hypothesis, I use annual aggregate stock returns from 1871 to 1999. 
The stock price and dividends are from the Cowles All-Stock Index between 1871 and 
1926 and the S&P composite index thereafter. The source of the data is Robert Shiller 
(http://aida.econ.yale.edu/~shiller/data/chapt26.html).  
  The test results are presented in Tables 1 and 2. The results in Table 1 are derived 
under the assumption that the required rate of return from stocks is constant at 5%. The 
results in Table 2 are derived under the assumptions that the required rate of return is 
variable and equal to the nominal interest rate and that the risk premium is constant at 
6%.
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P . Like Mankiw, Romer, and Shapiro (1991), standard errors are 
corrected for possible serial correlation and heteroskedasticity. 
  The model is generally supported by the data and the present value hypothesis is 
not rejected when the horizon is one period.
8 However, as the horizon (or holding period) 
increases, the hypothesis is more likely to be rejected. As predicted, the test statistic 
                                                           
7 The results are not sensitive to the choice of parameters and are generally consistent with results in 
Mankiw, Romer, and Shapiro (1991).  
8 Small-sample p-values are not provided since Mankiw, Romer, and Shapiro (1991) report that asymptotic 
p-values are reliable.    13
increases with the horizon, and the average 
h
t q  is negative and grows in magnitude in 
most cases. Furthermore, the growth in 
h















E Q . The results imply that the failure of the present value hypothesis 
may stem from the awareness of heterogeneous expectations and speculative behavior. 
Previous tests of the hypothesis should therefore be reconsidered.  
 
3.2. Predictability of the Dispersion in Expectations 
Chen, Hong, and Stein (2001) and Diether, Malloy, and Scherbina (2001) report that the 
dispersion in expectations can predict future stock returns. Both papers interpret the 
predictability of the dispersion in expectations as a consequence of an upward bias in 
stock prices from frictions in the stock market and over-confidence of investors. In this 
sub-section, I examine whether part of the movements in aggregate stock prices can be 
explained by the movements of dispersion.
9 Unlike previous studies, however, I attribute 
the predictability of the dispersion to an upward bias from frictions in the market and 
speculative behavior resulting from the awareness of heterogeneous expectations. As 
shown in Corollary 2, a high  t σ  raises the current willingness to pay and lowers future 
willingness to pay on average when  t σ  follows a stationary process. Therefore, low 
                                                           
9 Note that the dispersion in expectations and risk are separate concepts. While the dispersion shows 
differences in expectations due to different initial priors about parameters, the risk normally means the 
variance from the homogeneous probability density function or co-movements between market returns and 
an individual stock’s returns.    14
future stock returns are predicted when  t σ  is high today. The negative relation between 
the dispersion and future returns becomes more evident as time goes on.  
I assume that the dispersion in investors’ expectations can be represented by the 
dispersion in analysts’ expectations. In particular, the dispersion in expectations is 
measured as the standard deviation in analysts earnings forecasts over current earnings.
10 
The standard deviation in the earnings forecasts for the S&P 500 index are from I/B/E/S, 
a financial research firm that collects forecasts of individual company earnings for 
current and subsequent fiscal years from analysts. I/B/E/S specifically asks analysts for 
forecasts of operating earnings per share, which excludes non-recurring expenses and 
income.  
I/B/E/S has reported forecasts of the aggregate S&P 500 earnings per share in the 
current and subsequent calendar years since January 1982. The forecasts for a given year 
are reported on a monthly basis beginning in March of the previous year. As a result, the 
forecast horizon becomes shorter as the calendar year progresses. For example, in March 
of each year the maximum forecast horizon is almost two full years, while in February 
the maximum forecast horizon is 10 months. To take advantage of the monthly frequency 
of the forecasts, I approximate the dispersion of 12-month ahead earnings forecasts ( t σ ) 
as follows: 




SD2  in December, January and February 
                                                           
10 Even if self-selection bias is considered as in Sherbina (2002), there is a positive relation between the 
dispersion in investors’ forecasts and the dispersion in analysts’ forecasts.   15
2)  = t σ
t
t m t m
t EA
SD w SD w
EA
SD 2 1
* ) 1 ( − +
=  in March through November 
where  t EA  is actual earnings at t,  t SD1  is the standard deviation of current year earnings 
forecasts,  t SD2  is the standard deviation of the following year earnings forecasts, and 
m w  is 9/12 in March, 8/12 in April, and so on, ending at 1/12 in November.  
  This measure of the dispersion is different from the one in Diether, Malloy, and 
Scherbina (2001) in two respects. First, an adjustment is taken in order to hold the 
forecast horizon constant. Although it is not perfect, this adjustment is important because 
the dispersion is expected to depend on the forecast horizon. Second, the standard 
deviation is normalized by actual earnings rather than the mean of earnings forecasts to 
eliminate possible forecastability from earnings forecasts in the denominator.  
Monthly movements of  t σ  and its sample periodogram are shown in Figure 1, 
and summary statistics of  t σ  are provided in the Appendix. Data for the S&P 500 
monthly price index, S&P 500 monthly dividend yield, S&P 500 monthly price-earnings 
ratio, monthly consumer price index, and three-month Treasury bill rates are from the 
DRI database.
11 
Table 3 shows the results of the long-horizon regression using the dispersion in 
earnings forecast ( t σ ) as a regressor. The significance of the coefficient is reported using 
both Newey-West standard errors and Hodrick standard errors since Ang and Bekaert 
(2001) reports a discrepancy between the measures. I use a one-sided test since the model 
                                                           
11 The DRI code for the S&P 500 monthly price index is FSPCOM, the code for the S&P 500 monthly 
dividend yield is FSDXP, the code for the S&P 500 monthly price-earnings ratio is FSPXE, the code for 
monthly consumer price index is PUNEW and the codes for three-monthTreasury bill rates is FYGM3.    16
predicts a negative coefficient for the dispersion. Over the sample period covered in this 
paper, the dispersion appears to predict future stock returns from a 5-month horizon to 
46-month horizon when Newey-West standard errors are used. If Hodrick standard errors 
are used, the dispersion has predictive power for future stock returns between 15-month 
horizon and 36-month horizon. The dispersion appears to have predictive power at 
intermediate horizons although there is a discrepancy in Newey-West and Hodrick t-
statistics.   
During these horizons, the coefficient of the dispersion in the regression is 
significantly negative, and the dispersion alone appears to explain up to 20% of the 
movements in future stock returns. The estimated coefficients in the regression imply that 
the dispersion higher than the average by two standard deviations forecasts 7% lower 
stock return over 30 months. These results are generally consistent with Chen, Hong, and 
Stein (2001) and Diether, Malloy, and Scherbina (2001). 
Furthermore, the predictive power from  t σ  looks hump-shaped. The significance 
of the coefficient of  t σ  and 
2 R  both first increase with the length of the horizon but then 
begin to decline around 28 months. The results presented here are not subject to the 
potential inference problems that arise with other popular predicting variables which have 
roots much closer to unity because the autocorrelation of  t σ  is much lower than unity 
(see Table A1 in the Appendix). 
  I next address whether the dispersion in earnings forecasts contains any 
incremental information about future stock returns by running the following regression:  
k t t t k t t b Z a r r + + + + + + = + + ε σ γ 0 1 L       ( 8 )    17
where  t Z  is composed of other popular forecasting variables found in the literature. Fama 
and French (1988), Campbell and Shiller (1988a, 1988b), and Campbell, Lo and 
MacKinlay (1997) find that the ratios of price to dividends or price to earnings have 
strong predictive power for future stock returns. Lamont (1998) shows that the log payout 
ratio (log dividends to earnings ratio) performs well in predicting stock returns. Campbell 
(1991), and Ang and Bekaert (2001) report that the relative Treasury bill rate is a good 
forecasting variable for stock returns.  
The regression results are given in Table 4. Even with other popular forecasting 
variables, the coefficient of the dispersion is significant between the 25-month horizon 
and 36-month horizon with Newey-West corrected t-statistics and between 27-month 
horizon and 31-month horizon with Hodrick corrected t-statistic. Furthermore, from the 
21-month horizon, the incremental 
2 R  is positive and indicates that  t σ  adds up to almost 
9% of the explanatory power. Like the previous regression results,  t σ  seems to have 
hump-shaped predictive power. 
The sample periodogram of  t σ  in Figure 1 may be able to explain the hump-
shaped feature of the predictive power, which seems at first sight to contradict the 
prediction that the effect from  t σ  on future stock returns becomes more evident as time 
passes. More precisely, the model predicts that the predictive power of  t σ  should 
increase monotonically in the length of horizon, if all other things are constant. However, 
the monotonicity of the predictive power is likely to be destroyed by a cycle with a period 
centering on approximately 26 months because the peak around j = 9 explains a relatively   18
higher portion of the variation in  t σ .
12 Roughly speaking, this cycle corresponds to the 
horizon when the predictive power from  t σ  begins to decline. 
  In addition, the results in Table 4 are almost identical if one replaces the log 
earnings price ratio with the log dividend price ratio. Neither the log earnings price ratio 
nor the log dividend earnings ratio has remarkable predictive ability, especially with 
Hodrick standard errors. Their predictive power appears briefly around one-year horizon. 
However, the relative Treasury bill rate has relatively good predictive power for future 
stock returns at short horizons, as reported in previous research (see Campbell (1991) and 
Ang and Bekaert (2001)). Nevertheless,  t σ  predicts future stock returns at intermediate 
horizons, regardless of whether Newey-West corrected t-statistics or Hodrick corrected t-
statistics are used.  
  Although the predictability of the dispersion can be observed by long-horizon 
regressions, there are two major pitfalls in applying the asymptotic theory to t-statistics in 
long-horizon regressions (see Campbell, Lo, and MacKinlay. (1997, Chapter 7)). The 
first problem arises from the persistence of regressors in long-horizon regressions. It is a 
well-known fact that other forecasting variables such as the dividend price ratio are very 
persistent and seem to contain roots highly close to unity. Since the dispersion is not as 
persistent as other forecasting variables, this problem should not be as serious. Secondly, 
observations in the dependent variable of long-horizon regressions are overlapping, a 
problem that is especially serious when the horizon is large relative to the sample size. 
                                                           
12 The value of j and the frequency of a cycle (
j ω ) have the following relation:  T j j / 2π ω =  where T is the 
sample size.   19
The long-horizon regressions in this paper may have this problem. As a result, some 
finite sample biases may appear.  
To examine possible finite sample biases, I conduct a Monte Carlo simulation. 
Under the null hypothesis that the coefficient of the dispersion equals zero, stock prices 
reflect the present value of future dividends. Hence, I generate artificial data for 
dividends, and then stock prices and stock returns are calculated from these generated 
dividends, according to Mankiw, Romer, and Shapiro (1991). After estimating the 
dispersion process under an AR(1) specification, I next generate artificial data for the 
dispersion using the estimated coefficients. The AR(1) specification is chosen because 
the Schwarz Criterion supports this specification and because the first lagged dispersion 
( 1 − t σ ) is the only variable that has consistently significant estimated coefficients under 
AR(1) through AR(12) specifications.
13 Innovations are bootstrapped from regression 
residuals under the AR(1) specification.    
As shown in Table 5, the 5% critical value for t-statistics becomes greater in 
magnitude as the horizon increases, indicating that the finite sample bias becomes more 
serious with the length of horizon. However, the distortion does not seem to be great 
enough to reject the previous results since the actual t-statistics for the dispersion are 
greater in magnitude than the 5% critical values from the simulated empirical distribution 
at intermediate horizons. This implies that the actual t-statistics obtained in the long-
horizon regressions are very rare under the null hypothesis. If Newey-West corrected t-
statistics are used, the p-value is even lower than 1% at intermediate horizons. Therefore, 
                                                           
13 See Table A2 in the Appendix.   20
the null hypothesis that the dispersion has no predictive power for future stock returns at 
intermediate horizons can be rejected at a conventional significance level. 
 
4. CONCLUSION 
Under the presence of heterogeneous expectations due to different initial prior beliefs, it 
is natural for investors to exploit the difference in expectations. This paper shows that 
investors compare the payoff from holding a stock for one period with the current price 
when they are aware of heterogeneous expectations. An investors’ willingness to pay for 
a stock can therefore be written as the sum of fundamentals and the gap between market’s 
valuation and an investor’s valuation.  
Predictions based on the model are supported by data. The pattern of test statistics 
in the volatility test (Mankiw, Romer and Shapiro (1991)) is consistent with the model’s 
prediction, and the present value hypothesis is not rejected when holding period is short. 
Furthermore, the dispersion in expectations appears to have predictive power for future 
stock returns at intermediate horizons.
14 These results suggest that investors may 
speculate in the stock market.  
 Although  the  source of heterogeneous expectations remains uncertain, the results 
of this paper indicate that stock prices reflect both fundamentals and investors’ concerns 
about what others are expecting. Hence, to adequately explain stock prices, future models 
should incorporate the effects of heterogeneous expectations.  
 
                                                           
14 An interesting future research topic would be an investigation of whether the predictive power of the 
dispersion stems from speculative consideration or from over-confidence.   21
APPENDIX 
1.  Proofs 
Proposition 1. When an investor maximizes wealth at time t, then  




t P D E P γ γ .         

















t P D E P γ γ . Suppose that k > 
1 in the definition of 
a
t P ˆ  and that an investor has found an optimal investment strategy 
after time t+k. 




t t P P P ˆ < < . Since both 
a
t P  and 
a
t P ˆ  are greater than  t P , the 
investor buys stocks when either 
a
t P  or 
a
t P ˆ  is used as the willingness to pay at 
time t. However, 
a
t P ˆ  requires that the investor should hold stocks for the first k 




t P D E P E γ γ , 








t P D E P E + + − + + < γ γ  hold. If any 




t P D E P E + + − + + > γ γ  for  k h < < 1 , then the investor expects greater 
return by switching stocks to bonds at time t+h-1 than buying stocks at time t and 
holing them for the remaining periods consecutively. Even when 








t P D E P E γ γ ,…, and 




t P D E P E + + − + + < γ γ , using 
a
t P  as the willingness to pay will not 
terminate the option to obtain the return from 
a
t P ˆ . Actually, using 
a
i t P+  for 
k i ≤ ≤ 0  consecutively will result in the same level of wealth as 
a
t P ˆ . Therefore, 
although both 
a
t P  and 
a
t P ˆ  give the same signal, 
a
t P ˆ  is not the optimal strategy for   22
the first k periods except one case. Furthermore, even when 
a
t P ˆ  is the optimal 
choice, the return from the use of 
a
t P ˆ  as the willingness to pay for a stock is not 
given up by the use of 
a
t P . The same result can be exactly replicated by using 
a
t P  consecutively. 




t t P P P < < ˆ . Although both 
a
t P  and 
a
t P ˆ  are greater than  t P , 
buying a stock, holding it for one period, and then switching the stock to bonds is 
expected to yield higher return than buying a stock and holding it for k periods. 


















t P D E P P D E P γ γ γ γ  implies 

















t P E P D E γ γ , which states that the reselling the stock 
and buying bonds at time t+1 is expected to result in greater return than 
continuing to hold the stock for the remaining k-1 periods. 




t P P P < < ˆ . Although the investor will buy bonds following the 
signal from either 
a
t P  or 
a
t P ˆ , buying bonds and holding them for k periods is not 




t P D E P E γ γ , 








t P D E P E + + − + + > γ γ . Also, when 








t P D E P E γ γ ,…, and 




t P D E P E + + − + + > γ γ , the expected wealth from holding bonds for k 
periods can be achieved by using 
a
t P  consecutively during the periods between t 
and t+k.    23




t P P P < < ˆ . The investor will buy bonds according to the signal 
from either 
a
t P  or 
a
t P ˆ . However, holding the bonds for k periods is not optimal 
because switching the bonds to stocks at time t+1 is more profitable. Since  


















t P D E P P D E P γ γ γ γ  which implies 

















t P E P D E γ γ , buying stocks at time t+1 is expected to be 
more profitable than buying or holding bonds. 




t P P P < < ˆ . Obviously, buying a stock and holding it for only one 
period at time t is more profitable than buying a bond at time t, which is expected 
to be more profitable than buying a stock and holding it for k periods at time t. 
Thus, the investor should buy a stock and hold it for one period. 




t P P P ˆ < < . Then, buying a bond at time t, reselling the bond and 
buying stocks financed by the reselling at time t+1 will be more profitable than 
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t P E P D E γ γ . 
Furthermore, the last expression means that the expected return from buying a 
bond first at time t, reselling it and buying stocks financed by the resale of bond at 
time t+1 is greater than buying a stock and holding it for k periods. Therefore, the 
investor should not buy stocks at time t. The investor must buy bonds at time t, 
resell the bonds and buy stocks immediately before the stock price is expected to 
rise.  
So far, this proof has shown that one can always find more profitable alternative strategy 
or equally profitable alternative strategy when 
a
t P ˆ  is used as the willingness to pay for a 
stock rather than 
a











t P D E γ γ  when k > 1 cannot be the 
willingness to pay for a stock when the investor maximizes expected wealth.■ 
 
Proposition 2. If limited short sales are allowed up to some finite amount, then there 
exists an equilibrium in the stock market. 
Proof: Since the bond market has perfectly elastic supply and is always at the equilibrium 
and since investors must meet the budget constraint due to the limited short sales, the 
stock market is at the equilibrium due to Walras’ law.■ 
 









jσ γ . Then,  
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t Z E D E σ γ γ        
where  ] [⋅ t E  is the expectation operator for an econometrician who has no knowledge 
about investors’ initial priors of the parameters about the dividend process. 
Proof: The first and second equalities are given in the text. The third equality holds 
because of the law of iterated expectations. Since 
a
i t Z +  is a standard normal random 








jσ γ  implies that coefficients of 
a
i t Z +  
are square summable,  0 ] [ ] [
1 1


















t Z E Z E σ γ σ γ .
15■ 
                                                           
15 For a detailed explanation about the relation between square summability and interchanging the order of 
integration and summation, see Hamilton (1994, p. 52).   26
TABLE A1 
Summary statistics for the dispersion ( t σ ) and other forecasting variables 
The sample contains monthly observations from January 1982 to February 2001.  t t p d −  
is log dividend price ratio measured as the log difference between the sum of dividends 
paid on the S&P 500 Index over the previous year and the current level of the Index. 
t t p e −  is log earnings price ratio measured as the log difference between the sum of 
earnings paid on the Index over the previous year and the current level of the Index. 
t t e d −  is log payout ratio (log dividend earnings ratio) measured as the log difference 
between the sum of earnings and the sum of dividends paid on the Index over the 
previous year.  t rrel  is relative short term Treasury bill rate, which is the current month’s 
Treasury bill rate minus its previous 12-month moving average.  t σ  is the dispersion in 
forecasts (the ratio of standard deviation of earnings forecasts and actual earnings). 
Autocorrelation is the first autocorrelation of each variable. ADF (Augmented Dickey-
Fuller) test is t-statistics on β  in the regression  α ς ς + ∆ + + ∆ = − − p t p t t x x x L 1 1  
t t e x + + −1 β  where  t x  represents each forecasting variable. Lag orders are selected by Ng 
and Perron procedure. 
 
Univariate Summary Statistics 
  t t p d −   t t p e −   t t e d −   t rrel   t σ  
Mean -3.58 -2.88 -0.70  -0.0022  0.07 
Standard 
Deviation 
0.44 0.38 0.18  0.0096  0.02 
Autocorrela-
tion 
0.98 0.98 0.98 0.93 0.73 
ADF  test    -0.78 -2.27 -0.76 -3.73 -3.98 
Correlation Matrix 
  t t p d −   t t p e −   t t e d −   t rrel   t σ  
t t p d −   1.00 0.91 0.52 -0.33  -0.18 
t t p e −    1.00  0.13  -0.38  -0.29 
t t e d −      1.00  -0.01  0.41 
t rrel       1.00  0.04 
t σ        1.00   27
TABLE A2 
 
The estimation of lag orders for the dispersion 
 
The sample contains monthly observations from January 1982 to February 2001. * 
indicates the optimal lag order. AIC stands for Akaike’s Information Criterion. SC stands 
for Schwarz Criterion. HQ stands for Hannan-Quinn Criterion. 
 
 
Lag Order  AIC  SC  HQ 
0 -7.8791  -7.8636  -7.8728 
1 -8.8190  -8.7880*  -8.8065 
2 -8.8239  -8.7773  -8.8051 
3 -8.8443  -8.7822  -8.8192* 
4 -8.8497*  -8.7721  -8.8184 
5 -8.8496  -8.7566  -8.8121 
6 -8.8406  -8.7319  -8.7967 
7 -8.8317  -8.7075  -8.7816 
8 -8.8231  -8.6834  -8.7667 
9 -8.8160  -8.6607  -8.7533 
10 -8.8081  -8.6373  -8.7391 
11 -8.8009  -8.6146  -8.7256 
12 -8.7917  -8.5899  -8.7102 
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TABLE 1 
Volatility tests under constant required rate of return (r=5%) 



































,  ) ( 3 2 1 Q Q Q q
h
t + − =  and 
2 χ  is the test statistic that 
h
t q  is equal to zero. Hansen-Hodrick standard errors with 






0  and naïve 









i t t D
r









i t t D
r
P  for 
naïve forecast II. Prices and dividends are in real terms. 
 
h  1 Q   2 Q   3 Q  
h
t q   2 χ  
Naïve Forecast I 
1 0.0928  0.0311  0.0647  -0.0030  0.1160 
6 0.2226  0.2392  0.0558  -0.0723  2.2137 
12 0.4121  0.5261  0.0536  -0.1677  5.7074 
18 0.4840  0.6422  0.0547  -0.2129  9.1515 
 
Naïve Forecast II 
1 0.4692  0.0596  0.3353  0.0743  1.3332 
6 0.5692  0.3220  0.2246  0.0226  0.0274 
12 0.5519  0.5430  0.1968  -0.1879  2.0545 
18 0.3828  0.4990  0.2001  -0.3163  10.5058 
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TABLE 2 
Volatility tests under variable required rate of return 
The sample contains yearly observations from 1871 to 1999. Constant risk premium is 



































,  ) ( 3 2 1 Q Q Q q
h
t + − =  and 
2 χ  is the test statistic that 
h
t q  is equal to 
zero. Hansen-Hodrick standard errors with Newey-West weights are used for the test. 















i t t D P
φ
.  t W  is  t P  for naïve 









i t t D
r
P  for naïve forecast II. Prices and dividends are in 
nominal terms.  
 
h  1 Q   2 Q   3 Q  
h
t q   2 χ  
Naïve Forecast I 
1 0.1049  0.0285  0.0831  -0.0068  0.7544 
6 0.1382  0.1202  0.0714  -0.0535  3.8110 
12 0.1958  0.2227  0.0659  -0.0928  6.3948 
18 0.2640  0.3107  0.0653  -0.1120  6.0665 
 
Naïve Forecast II 
1 0.9584  0.0764  0.8707  0.0113  0.0205 
6 0.7600  0.3154  0.6350  -0.1904  1.2896 
12 0.8649  0.6170  0.5506  -0.3028  1.2830 
18 0.9550  0.8030  0.5313  -0.3793  2.0716 
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TABLE 3 
Dispersion in long-horizon regression 
The sample contains monthly observations from January 1982 to February 2001. The 
regression equation is  K K t t K t t K b a r r , 0 1 ) ( + + + + + = + + ε σ L  where r is monthly log real 
returns on the S&P 500 index and  t σ  is the dispersion in forecasts (the ratio of standard 
deviation and actual earnings).  NW K b T )) ( (  is the t-statistic using Newey and West 
(1987) standard errors with K-1 lags.  H K b T )) ( (  is the t-statistic using Hodrick (1992) 
standard errors.  
 
K  1  6  12 18 24 26 
b(K)  -0.1565 -1.0224 -1.1335 -1.9821 -2.6917 -3.0994 
NW K b T )) ( (
 
-1.3671 -2.4755 -2.0201 -2.6967 -3.4455 -3.7125 
H K b T )) ( (   -1.3383 -2.1433 -1.4631 -1.8888 -2.0678 -2.2417 
2 R   0.0085 0.0468 0.0330 0.0759 0.1301 0.1679 
 
K  28 30 32 34 36 38 
b(K)  -3.4672 -3.6035 -3.3064 -3.0291 -2.7805 -2.6172 
NW K b T )) ( (
 
-4.2228 -3.9020 -3.6609 -3.7420 -3.3062 -2.7500 
H K b T )) ( (   -2.3791 -2.3585 -2.1717 -1.8752 -1.6423 -1.4935 
2 R   0.1972 0.1905 0.1507 0.1209 0.0963 0.0791 
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TABLE 4 
Long-horizon regression with disperion and other forecasting variables 
The sample contains monthly observations from January 1982 to February 2001. The 
regression equation is  ) )( ( ) )( ( 2 1 0 1 t t t t K t t e d K b p e K b a r r − + − + = + + + + L  
K K t t t K b rrel K b , 4 3 ) ( ) ( + + + + ε σ  where r is monthly log real returns on the S&P 500 
index,  t t p e −  is log earnings price ratio,  t t e d −  is log dividend earnings ratio,  t rrel  is 
the relative short-term Treasury bill rate (the three month Treasury bill rate minus its 12 
month backward moving average), and  t σ  is the dispersion in earnings forecasts.  NW T  is 
Newey-West corrected t-statistics.  H T  is Hodrick corrected t-statistics. 
2 R  without  t σ  is 
the adjusted 
2 R  when  t σ  is excluded from the regression equation. Incremental 
2 R  is 
the difference in 
2 R  when  t t p e − ,  t t e d − ,  t rrel , and  t σ  are used as regressors and 
when  t σ  is excluded from the regression. 
 
K  1  6  12 18 24 26 
Coeff. 0.0014 0.0435 0.1078 0.1041 0.0407 0.0143 
NW T   0.2104 1.3671 2.5262 1.5871 0.5743 0.1985 
t t p e −  
H T   0.2004 1.0567 1.7267 1.1645 0.3207 0.1037 
Coeff.  -0.0073 -0.0910 -0.2620 -0.2999 -0.2657 -0.2267 
NW T   -0.5610 -1.4621 -2.6516 -2.3437 -1.6932 -1.4117 
t t e d −  
H T   -0.5779 -1.3808 -1.9480 -1.5058 -1.0621 -0.8278 
Coeff. -0.6618  -1.7401  -0.5096 1.6170 2.3761 2.4288 
NW T   -2.6228 -1.5466 -0.3529 0.8323  1.0203  1.0397 
t rrel  
H T   -2.8627 -1.7245 -0.2965 0.7045  0.8116  0.7703 
Coeff.  -0.1108 -0.4150 0.4436 -0.2767 -1.4343 -2.1192 
NW T   -0.7749 -0.7497 0.6873 -0.3431 -1.6281 -2.1140 
t σ  
H T   -0.7634 -0.7822 0.5787 -0.2899 -1.1811 -1.6098 
2 R  without  t σ   0.0320 0.1234 0.1927 0.1952 0.1734 0.1627 
Incremental 
2 R   -0.0012 0.0016 -0.0001 -0.0028 0.0222 0.0516 
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TABLE 4 (Continued) 
 
K  28 30 32 34 36 38 
Coeff. 0.0042 0.0188 0.0216 0.0126 0.0020 -0.0190 
NW T   0.0547 0.2204 0.2306 0.1213 0.0168 -0.1536 
t t p e −  
H T   0.0277 0.1235 0.1551 0.0840 0.0123 -0.1196 
Coeff.  -0.1814 -0.1237 -0.1298 -0.1439 -0.1610 -0.1636 
NW T   -1.0967 -0.6463 -0.6451 -0.7272 -0.8259 -0.8746 
t t e d −  
H T   -0.6116 -0.4280 -0.5373 -0.5742 -0.6160 -0.6747 
Coeff. 3.0537 3.9689 4.5822 4.9982 5.0531 4.1650 
NW T   1.2565 1.4748 1.5624 1.5767 1.4897 1.1970 
t rrel  
H T   0.9022 1.1206 1.2499 1.3116 1.3315 1.1268 
Coeff.  -2.7151 -3.0103 -2.6827 -2.4040 -2.1532 -2.1150 
NW T   -2.5864 -2.3306 -1.9929 -1.9692 -1.6862 -1.6082 
t σ  
H T   -1.8778 -1.8667 -1.5993 -1.3236 -1.1297 -1.0674 
2 R  without  t σ   0.1570 0.1461 0.1415 0.1393 0.1283 0.0913 
Incremental 
2 R   0.0814 0.0871 0.0638 0.0482 0.0356 0.0315 
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TABLE 5 
Dispersion in long-horizon regression and small sample biases 
The regression equation is  K K t t K t t K b a r r , 0 1 ) ( + + + + + = + + ε σ L  where r is the log real 
return and  t σ  is the dispersion in forecasts (the ratio of standard deviation in analysts’ 
forecasts and actual earnings). The artificial data for the log real return are generated 
according to Mankiw, Romer, and Shapiro (1991) under the null hypothesis that the 
dispersion has no predictive power. The artificial data for the dispersion are generated 
under an autoregressive process.  NW T  is the t-statistic from actual long-horizon 
regressions using Newey and West (1987) standard errors. ‘ NW cv  (5%)’ is 5% critical 
values from the empirical distribution in the Monte Carlo simulation using Newey and 
West (1987) standard errors.  H T  is the t-statistic from actual long-horizon regressions 
using Hodrick (1992) standard errors. ‘ H cv  (5%)’ is 5% critical values from the 
empirical distribution in the Monte Carlo simulation using Hodrick (1992) standard 
errors. The number of simulation is 1000. 
 
 K  1  6  12 18 24 26 
NW T   -1.3671 -2.4755 -2.0201 -2.6967 -3.4455 -3.7125 
NW cv (5%)  -1.6998 -2.0519 -2.0609 -2.0655 -2.2427 -2.1995 
NW value p −
 
0.084 0.027 0.051 0.019 0.007 0.007 
H T   -1.3383 -2.1433 -1.4631 -1.8888 -2.0678 -2.2417 
H cv (5%)  -1.6018 -1.6548 -1.6525 -1.6974 -1.8671 -1.9557 
H value p −   0.090 0.020 0.073 0.036 0.037 0.026 
 
K  28 30 32 34 36 38 
NW T   -4.2228 -3.9020 -3.6609 -3.7420 -3.3062 -2.7500 
NW cv (5%)  -2.2280 -2.2718 -2.2691 -2.3442 -2.5539 -2.5325 
NW value p −
 
0.004 0.007 0.010 0.008 0.019 0.042 
H T   -2.3791 -2.3585 -2.1717 -1.8752 -1.6423 -1.4935 
H cv (5%)  -1.9346 -1.9359 -1.9617 -2.0367 -2.0217 -1.9920 
H value p −   0.019 0.022 0.032 0.060 0.079 0.104 
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FIGURE 1  
Dispersion and its sample periodogram 
The first panel shows the dispersion measured as the ratio of standard deviation in 
analysts’ earnings forecasts to actual earnings between January 1982 and February 2001. 
The second panel shows the sample periodogram of the dispersion. 
 


















−4 Sample Periodgram for Dispersion
 
 
 
 